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A B S T R A C T 
 
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its 
members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain 
the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of 
firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because 
otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members 
are unable to sustain collusion. 
   





For many years it was widely held among economists that …rms could not exercise market
power collectively without some form of explicit coordination. However the theory of
repeated game has cast some doubt on this approach. Stable arrangements may require
little coordination between …rms, and possibly none at all. This has raised a dilemma
for the design of a policy towards collusion. If the legal standard focuses on explicit
coordination, a large number of collusive outcome can fall outside the prohibition, and if
it tries to cover collusion without explicit coordination, it will prohibit non-cooperative
practises.
Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty stipulates that agreements or concerted practises
between …rms which distort competition are prohibited. What is meant by ”agreements”
and ”concerted practises” is not further speci…ed in the treaty1. However, decisions re-
cently taken by the Commission show that often …rms behavior that do not involve a
process of coordination are overlooked although they could mean an exercise of market
power.
The literature about collusion, mainly deal with two di¤erent approaches. The models
on explicit collusion (Selten (1983) and d’Aspremont et al. (1983)) have mainly focused
on the incentives of …rms to participate in a cartel agreement. These papers focus on
…rms ”participation constraints” and investigate cartel stability in static models. Two
di¤erent incentives play a role here. Firms face a trade o¤ between participation and
nonparticipation in the cartel, …rms have an incentive to join the cartel so as to achieve a
more collusive outcome, but on the other hand have an incentive to stay out of the cartel
to free-ride on the cartel e¤ort to restrict production.
The models on implicit collusion (Friedman (1971)), using a supergame theoretical
framework, have focusedon the problem ofenforcement ofcollusive behavior. This second
strand is a supergame-theoretic approach. It is called implicit collusion. This focuses on
…rms ”incentive constraints”2. They have studied under which circumstances collusion
1Although it is tempting to associate “agreements” with explicit collusion and “concerted practices”
with implicit collusion.
2”Participation constraints” are …rms incentives to join the cartel or the fringe, meanwhile ”Incentive
constraints” are the incentives to cheat on the cooperation agreement.
2can be sustained as an equilibrium of the repeated game. Most research on the …eld have
studied symmetric settings and have focused on the sustainability of the most pro…table
symmetric equilibrium. The reason to select this equilibrium is that it will be the one that
…rms will agree to play if they secretly meet to discuss their pricing plans (Mas-Colell et
al (1996)).
The main point of the paper is that this argument is compelling but it does not take
into account that …rms may prefer not to attend this meeting in order not to participate
in the coordination to a collusive agreement. This takes us back to the literature on
the incentive to participate in a cartel, mentioned above. But now the analysis is richer
because one has to study how does this participation incentive interact with the incentive
to maintain a collusive agreement (Nocke (1999)). As a …rst step, I study how does the
size of a cartel a¤ect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement in
a supergame theoretical framework. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger
the cartel is. To obtain the result I study the sustainability of partial cartels i.e. cartels
that do not include all the …rms in a given industry. Partial cartels are often observed in
reality, being the OPEC the most well-known example.
The previous result has implications on cartel formation, because it reduces the in-
centives to free-ride from a cartel by defecting from it. I can illustrate the idea with the
following extreme example. I …nd that for some discount factors, the only sustainable
cartel is the cartel that comprises all …rms in the industry.
Then all …rms have incentives to participate in the cartel, because otherwise collusion
completely collapses. This completely eliminates the gains from free-riding at the partici-
pation stage. In practice it is easier to …ght against explicit than against implicit collusion
because the former is easier to prove. The model highlights that policy measures that in-
duce …rms to replace explicit with implicit collusion3 to escape antitrust prosecution may
have its costs. Fighting against explicit collusion (and forcing …rms to collude tacitly)
has the positive e¤ect of weaken the incentives to maintain a collusive agreement but the
negative e¤ect of making stronger the incentives to participate in a cartel.
3”When the legal advisors of cartel members discovered that Article 85 had to be taken seriously, they
had their clients throw their agreements in the waste basket. Simultaneously, the attention of DGn IV
shifted to the detection of tacit collusion, on the assumption that explicit collusion was being replaced
by tacit collusion” (Phlips (1994)).
3Therefore the total e¤ect on price is uncertain. In the particular model I analyze price
is higher with implicit than with explicit collusion.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section, the central model
of the paper is set. The sustainability of the partial cartel is analyzed with the ”trigger
strategies”4. Inthe next section, the participationgameisset. Firms decide …rst wether to
join the cartel or not, afterwards the …rms in…nitely play a quantity game. The main aim
of this section is to study the interaction between incentive and participation constraints.
Afterwards the sustainability of the partial cartel is analyzed using an optimal penal code
to enforce collusion following Abreu (1986). The last section is left to analyze a very
simple model constructed so that both cartel size and cost asymmetries among cartel
members play a role in determining the stable cartel agreement.
The model predicts that the size of the cartels enforced can be larger in the implicit
collusion model than in the explicit collusion model.
We can think of an interesting example. The introduction of the 1956 Restrictive
Practices Act in UK led to the registration and subsequent abolition of explicit restrictive
agreements between …rms. However, a considerable number of agreements were not regis-
tered and continued secretly. Studies of the impact of the 1956 Act showed that in many
industries explicit price-…xing agreements had been replaced by informal agreements to
exchange information on prices, quantities and conditions of sale, and that in many cases
these had serious adverse e¤ects on competition. The most relevant case could be the elec-
trical power industry. A large number of …rms were members of the Transformer Maker´s
Association. Collusion among members of the association had been e¤ective during the
1950´s, and competition was slow to emerge after the agreement was formally abandoned
following a Court judgment. However, explicit price-…xing was replaced by the exchange
of information on prices and tenders, and this helped to sustain prices and margins for
several years. Furthermore, several …rms that were not members of the association at the
time of the Court hearing seem to have adhered to the implicit arrangements.
4The sustainability of partial cartels in a dynamic setting is considered by Martin (1990) in a ho-
mogeneous …rms context. However despite our model, decision is sequential, that is cartel …rms act as
stackelberg leaders.
42 Partial Cartels
Assume that n …rms, where n > 2, indexed i, i = 1;2;3;:::;n compete in a market whose




qi denotes the production of …rm i. Assume …rms simultaneously choose quantities 5.
A (partial) cartel will be said to be active in this market if there is a group of …rms
(cartel members) that maximize joint pro…ts and the remaining …rms (nonmembers or
fringe …rms) maximize individual pro…ts. When a cartel of k …rms is active, members











nk ¡ k2 + 3k + 2+ n
(2)
In this situation, Pro…ts of members and nonmembers are given respectively by ¼k
m
and ¼k
nm. Observe that if k = 1, we have standard Cournot competition and q1
m = q1
nm.
We are going to study under which conditions playing (1) and (2) in each period can
be sustained as an equilibrium of a game where the one stage game described above is
repeated in…nite times. Firms will be assumed to discount the future at a factor of ±.
Member …rms are denoted with a natural number from 1 to k.
Cartel members will sustain cooperation by using ”trigger strategies”, that is when
cheating …rms are punished with in…nite reversion to the Nash Cournot equilibrium.
Trigger strategies for a partial cartel can be formulated the following way, where qt;i
denotes the strategy played by …rm i in period t:
Firm i, i = 1;::k plays
8
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m if ql;j = qk
m for any l < t for j = 1;:::;k and for j 6= i
qt;i = q1
m otherwise:
Firm i, i = k +1;:::n plays
5Sha¤er(1995) considers the cartel as a Stackelberg leader because of its power to impose its most
preferred timing.
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nm if ql;j = qk
m for any l < t for j = 1;:::;k and for j 6= i
qt;i = q1
m otherwise:
Nonmember …rms play optimally, because the future play of rivals is independent
of how they play today and they maximize current pro…ts. Member …rms will behave
optimally if the discount factor is high enough. To obtain the conditions on the discount
factor such that using ”trigger strategies” is also optimal for member …rms, we have to
calculate the pro…ts of a member …rm that deviates from the cartel. They will choose:
qk
d =argmax
q P((k ¡ 1)qk
m + (n ¡ k)qk
nm + q)q ¡
q2
2
and will obtain ¼k
d like the pro…ts obtained in the period of deviation.















, the previous condition can be written in the following way.
If ±k ¸ 1 the cartel of size k can not be sustained for any ±. If ±k < 1, the cartel can
be sustained for ± ¸ ±k.
Although it may be surprising at …rst sight that some cartel sizes can not be sustained
in equilibrium, it comes from the well-known result in the literature that with Cournot
competition, mergers (or any other collusiveagreement) ofa small numberof …rms reduces
pro…ts because non-participating …rms react by increasing their production (see Salant et
al.(1983)).
Next proposition shows that the previous intuition extends to any cartel size in the
sense that whenever a cartel of size k is sustainable, cartels of larger size are also sustain-
able6.
Proposition 1 The cuto¤ discount factor (±k) that sustain the strategies described above,
is decreasing in the size of the cartel.
6Remark the similarity with the result in Salant et al.(1983) that if a merger of k …rms is pro…table,
a merger with more …rms is also pro…table.










Therefore variations of k have two di¤erent e¤ects. First,
¼k
m
¼d decreases when k in-
creases because deviation pro…ts increase more than pro…ts from being in the cartel of
k …rms. This would increase ±k. Second, as k increases,
¼1
m
¼d also decreases because ¼1
m
does not depend on k, and deviation pro…ts increase with k. Thus punishment becomes
proportionally more painful. This second e¤ect would decrease ±k.
The result from the Proposition1 comes from the fact that the seconde¤ect dominates
the …rst one.
3 The participation game.
In the previous Section we have obtained conditions on the discount factor under which
cartels of di¤erent sizes are active. In this Section, we will allow…rms to coordinate in the
di¤erent outcomes by showing their willingness to participate in a collusive agreement.
Those decisions will not a¤ect the payo¤ of …rms, but they will only be used as a coordi-
nation device: if k …rms decide to participate in a cartel agreement, only cartels of size k
can be observed in the repeated game.
This pre-comunication play is modelled as a stage prior to market competition. The
decision of each …rm relates to selecting a zero-one variable wi where:
wi : 1 i¤ …rm i joins the cartel
0 i¤ …rm i joins the fringe
If k …rms announce joining the cartel , the future play is only modi…ed if the discount
factor allows a cartel of k …rms to be active (± ¸ ±k). Otherwise, all …rms play the
Cournot quantity in all periods. In short, once a cartel of k …rms is formed, we will
assume that discounted payo¤s of member and nonmember …rms are respectively given

























We are going to look for the Nash equilibrium of the game.
In our model, a cartel of size k is an equilibrium con…guration (stable cartel) if the
following two conditions are satis…ed:
-Internal, stability: Either no collusion or:
¦k
m ¸ ¦k¡1
nm 8i 2 k and for k 2 (2;:::;n) (5)





nm 8i 2 k and for k 2 (1;:::;n ¡ 1) (6)
This participation game has been previously analyzed in the literature in cases where
…rms can sign binding contracts to sustain the outcome of the cartel7. In that case
collusion is saidto be explicit, while in our model is called implicit. With explicit collusion
sustainability of cartels is not at issue. Then payo¤s of players would be like (5) and (6)
taking ±k = 0. Solving the participation game for the case of explicit collusion will be
both a helpful step to solve it in our case and will provide us a benchmark to compare
the results.
The key point in the explicit collusion case is that for any cartel size, internal stability
is never satis…ed. Firms know that the goal of the cartel is to reduce production. Then
…rms will have incentives to leave the cartel inorder to free ride from the output reduction
agreed by the remaining cartel members.
Proposition 2 No cartel is stable, when collusion is explicit.
7See Donsimoni (1985). The only di¤erence is that it considers the Cartel behaves as a Stackelberg
leader while in our case the cartel and nonmember …rms compete à la Cournot.
8We are ready now to determine the Nash equilibrium of the participation game. This
game has many equilibria that imply that no cartel is active. For example all …rms
deciding not to join the cartel is always an equilibrium. For ± < ±n any choice by …rms is
an equilibrium because the participation decisions are irrelevant because no cartel can be
sustained. To clarify the analysis I will focus on the equilibria where cartels are active. In
other words we will determine which of the sustainable cartels are also stable. We state
the results in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 No cartel is active if ± < ±n. Whenever ± 2 (±k;±k¡1) and ±k < 1, a
cartel of k …rms is active.
The fact that for ± < ±n no cartel is active comes from Proposition 1. Therefore we
have only to explain the second part of the Proposition. For ±k¡1 > ± ¸ ±k only cartels
of size greater or equal than k can be sustained. Cartels of sizes greater than k are not
stable, because the result in Proposition 2 applies: internal stability does not hold.
The cartel of size k is internally stable, because …rms know that quitting the cartel
means that collusion fully collapses and they would obtain the Cournot pro…ts. Therefore
the cartel of size k is stable. That is only the smallest cartels among those which can be
sustained is stable in the Participation Game.
Once characterized the equilibrium of the participation game, we see that there are
two di¤erent corollaries we can extract from Proposition 3.
Simply comparing Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 we get the following conclusion:
Corollary 1 If ± 2 (±n;1) the size of active cartels is bigger with implicit collusion than
with explicit collusion.
In explicit collusion cartels are always e¤ective because when members collude they
have to commit themselves by signing binding contracts. However in implicit collusion
as …rms do not dispose of any commitment, when ± > ±n as we saw in Proposition 3 a
cartel of certain size is stable. It is precisely the success of the cartels what reduces the
incentive to participate in them in explicit collusion.
In the previous Section, we checked that cartels were only active if the discount factor
was high enough. Therefore prices were increasing in the discount factor. In the present
Section, the size of the cartel is determined endogenously. Then price may decrease with
9the discount factor, because it reduces the size of stable cartels. The failure of small
cartels to be sustainable when ± is low, induces …rms to create bigger cartels. This result
is recollected in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 When the size of the cartel is endogenously determined, if ± 2 (±n;1) price
decreases with the discount factor.
The reason is basically that as long as the cuto¤ of the discount factor is decreasing
with k, for low ±, only bigger cartels are sustained. Thus as ± increases, smaller cartels
associated to lower prices are enforced. We saw that for low ± , as long as no agreement
is possible, the price is the Nash equilibrium price.
104 Optimal punishment
The literature about implicit collusion has treated repeated game models using basically
two di¤erent types of strategies to enforce subgame perfect Nash equilibria (S.P.N.E.),
the ”trigger strategies” and the ”optimal punishment” strategies8. Trigger strategies
have been used in the …rst three sections of the model. We obtained that the cuto¤ of the
discount factor is decreasing with the size of the cartel, andthis led us to the results of the
third section. We will see in this section, if it is also true when cooperation is sustained
by the optimal punishment strategies.
Cooperation is sustained now with strategies where cheating …rms are punished with
the fastest and most severe possible punishment. Abreu(1986) outlines a symmetric, two-
phase output path that sustains collusive outcomes for an oligopoly of quantity setting
…rms. The output path considered by Abreu has a ”stick and carrot” pattern. The path
begins with a period of low per-…rm output for cartel members (qk
m): The strategy calls
for all cartel members to continue to produce qk
m, unless an episode of defection occurs. If
some …rm cheats on the agreement, all cartel …rms expand output for one period (qp
m) and
return to the most collusive sustainable output in the following periods, provided that
every player of the cartel went along with the …rst phase of the punishment. On the other
hand, fringe …rms just individually maximize per period pro…ts. The optimal punishment
strategies for a partial cartel can be formulated in the following way, where qt;i denotes
the strategy played by …rm i in period t:
Firm i, i = 1;:::;k plays: 8
> > > > > > > <




m if qt¡1;j = qk
m for j = 1;:::;k 8t = 2;3;:::;
qt;i = qk
m if qt¡1;j = qp
m for j = 1;:::;k 8t = 2;3;:::;
qt;i = qp
m otherwise:
Firm i, i = k +1;:::;n plays:
8The latter were …rstly set in a seminal paper from Abreu (1986). This strategies became popular in
the literature given their optimality and their renegotiation-proofness quality.
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n if qt¡1;j = qk
m, for j = 1;:::;k 8t = 2;3;:::;
qt;i = qk
n if qt¡1;j = qp






m + (n ¡ k ¡ 1)qo




nm is the quantity produced by the rest of the fringe …rms, that in equilibrium
would be qp
nm, qk
m is the quantity that maximizes cartel members joint pro…ts and qp
m is
the quantity that corresponds to the stick stage for cartel members. We see now how do
we obtain the corresponding outputs for the strategies to be a S.P.N.E.
Again, member …rms will behave optimally if the discount factor is high enough. To
obtain the conditions on the discount factor such that optimal punishment is also optimal
for member …rms, we need again the pro…ts of a member …rm that deviates from the
agreement. The punishment is considered optimal as long as it sustains the highest range













m) = 0 (7)
That is, whenever any player deviates from the desired equilibrium path, that player
can be punished by players switching to the worst possible equilibrium. Thus, discounted
pro…ts for the punishment path should equal the Minimax value (0 in our model).
Therefore, (qp
m) is such that (7) holds. As we did for the trigger strategies, we can
de…ne ¼d like the pro…ts obtained when …rms deviate from q, applying the one-periodbest
response function. We need then conditions for the punishment to be a S.P.N.E. for both
















m)) no deviation in the carrot stage (9)
From (8) and (7) we obtain that no deviation in the stick stage is only possible if
¼d(qp
m) = 0, since otherwise a …rm can deviate in the …rst period and keep doing so every
12time the punishment is reimposed. Hence the total output produced by (k ¡ 1) …rms
must be large enough that P((k ¡ 1)qp
m) · 0, which set a lower bound on the quantity
produced in the stick stage, independent of ±, and which also means that qp
nm = 0.






Summarizing, the way tobuild uptheoptimal punishmentconsists of taking the lowest
bound on qp
m from the condition ¼d(qp
m) = 0 as the value assigned in the punishment
phase to qp
m. From (8) we obtain the threshold of the discount factor for the stick stage.
Afterwards from thecondition 1
1¡±¼k(qk
m) ¸ ¼d(qk
m) we obtainthethresholdof the discount
factor for the carrot stage.
We call ±a, and ±b the discount factors that make (8) and (9) hold with equality
respectively. Therefore, from (7) and (8) we have that ± must be no smaller than ±a. and
from (7) and (9) that ± must be no smaller than ±b. So, the strategies described sustain
a S.P.N.E if:
± ¸ maxf±a;±bg (10)
It is easy to see that ±a is decreasing with k as long as is easier to punish as the size
of the cartel increases, that is, the condition P((k ¡ 1)qp
m) · 0 more easily holds.
On the other hand ±b increases with k. As we see in (10), the envelope from above
of both, represents the cuto¤ of the discount factor that sustain the strategies described
before as an equilibrium, that is ±. When the number of …rms is small, the …rst e¤ect
dominates.
Thus, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 The cuto¤ discount factor that sustain the strategies with the optimal
punishment, is decreasing in the size of the cartel, if the number of …rms n , is low
enough.
135 Asymmetric case
We will consider in this section a very simple example with heterogeneous …rms to see
wether and how the incentives to join the cartel or the fringe depend on cost asymmetry
comparing also both types of collusion.
As it is commonly believed, asymmetry hurts collusion. It becomes clear when the
cartel is formed by all …rms of the industry (see Rothschild, R. (1999)). However we will
see in this section wether asymmetry can help or not to enforce partial cartels.
We consider a market comprising 3 …rms indexed by i, i = 1;2;3: If qi denotes the




for i = 1;2 and
ci(qi) = dq2
i if i = 3, where d > 0. Then …rm 3 is the less e¢cient …rm if d >
1
2 and the
more e¢cient …rm if d <
1
2.9 Firms compete à la Cournot in a market whose demand is
given by P(Q) = 1¡ Q where Q =
P3
i=1qi .
We assume that these market conditions are stationary and …rms compete in in…nite
periods indexed by t = 1;2;3::: Firms discount the future at a rate of ±. Each cartel
member obtains the pro…ts of selling and producing the output quota assigned by the
cartel. This means that we exclude the possibility of side-payments among the members
of the cartel.
We assume that the cartel maximizes joint pro…ts.
5.1 Equilibrium
In this Section, we look for the size and the nature of the cartel that can be implemented
in our simpli…ed example. For that purpose we …rstly determine the sustainability of the
cartel in the repeated game and afterwards, following the same structure of the previous
section, we set the stable cartels of the explicit collusion model. Finally, the last result
establishes the equilibrium of the participation game.
9Cost functions are also assumed quadratic in the asymmetric case to rule out uninteresting cases, as
long as it would be clearly practical for the …rm with the lowest cost to produce the entire cartel output
if marginal costs were constant.
145.1.1 Cartel sustainability.
We are going to study which strategies can sustain the di¤erent cartels as equilibria of the
in…nitely repeated game. We look for the equilibria when …rms play ”trigger strategies”.
As we said they consist of the immediate and unreversible switch to the non-collusive
solution once cheating is discovered, so that the threat consists of reversion to Nash-
Cournot forever if someone breaks the agreement.
To study sustainability we have to see the conditions referred before about °(k). We
get that the thresholdcalculated to sustainthe several cartel con…gurations aredecreasing
with d for …rms 1 and 2 and increasing for …rm 3.
The following Proposition summarizes the results for the three possible market con-
…gurations.
Proposition 5 The partial asymmetric cartel is never sustainable. The partial symmet-
ric cartel is sustainable if d > 0:77 and ± 2 (±2;1;1). The full cartel is sustainable if
0:41 < d < 1:118 and ± 2 (max[±3;1;±3;3];1).
Where ±n;i = Discount factor needed by the …rm i, to sustain a cartel of n members10.
We see that full collusion requires a certaindegree ofhomogeneity among …rms. Mean-
while a partial cartel will only be stable when the fringe is relatively ine¢cient compared
to the cartel .
5.1.2 Cartel stability.
We will see now the equilibrium of the participation game described in section three for
the case of our simpli…ed example, and for that we will set …rst the equilibrium of the
explicit collusion model.
Applying the concepts of internal and external stability de…ned before, the following
Proposition speci…es the type of cartels that are stable.
Proposition 6 When collusion is explicit, if d < 0:77 no cartel is stable and if d > 0:77
only the symmetric partial cartel is stable.
10Notice here that as long a partial asymmetric cartel is never sustainable, ±2;1 refers always to a partial
symmetric cartel. That is the discount factor needed to sustain an agreement between …rm 1 and 2.
15What we can see here is that the stability of the cartels dependbasically ontwo things;
…rst in a cartel there can not be a too ine¢cient …rm as long as it would be punished with
a very low production quota inside the cartel. Second, if the fringe is very e¢cient it can
take advantage of the low production of the cartel. That is the free riding of the fringe
on cartel production can make the cartel unpro…table.
Last Proposition leads us to the following result:
Proposition 7 The full cartel isstable if either0:41 < d < 0:77 and ± 2 (max[±3;1;±3;3];1)
or 0:77 < d < 0:85 and ± 2 (±3;1;±2;1). Partial symmetric cartel is stable if d > 0:77 and
± 2 (±2;1;1).
That means therefore that full collusion can only be stable when there exists certain
degree of homogeneity among …rms. The partial cartel can only be stable when is formed
by e¢cient …rms in the cartel and the ine¢cient …rm remains in the fringe.
From comparing Proposition8 with Proposition 10, one can check that if either 0:41 <
d < 0:77 and ± 2 (max[±3;1;±3;3];1) or 0:77 < d < 0:85 and ± 2 (±3;1;±2;1) cartel size is
greater when collusion is implicit than when it is explicit. This result may seem a bit
surprising at …rst sight, because explicit collusion makes cartels always successful. Indeed,
when ± is low, cartels are completely ine¤ective with implicit collusion. However, it is
again the success of cartels what reduces the incentives to participate in them. For the
range of parameters just mentioned, full cartel is stable with implicit collusion, because
…rms knowthatifthey donot participate, again, no degree ofcollusionis possible, because
partial cartels are not sustainable. On the other hand, full cartel is not stable with explicit
collusion, because each wants to abandon the cartel in order to free-ride from a partial
cartel.
We also have that when the asymmetry within …rms is large, that is when d grows,
if ± is close to one, asymmetry collapses full collusion, but enhances formation of partial
cartels.
For instance if ± is large enough, when d = 0:75, full collusion is stable. If the market
becomes more asymmetric, d = 0:8, full collusion collapses. However, a partial cartel is
enforced.
Therefore it turns out to be the case that asymmetry does not completely collapses
collusion if partial cartels can be enforced.
166 Conclusions
The main aim of the paper has been basically to analyze partial collusion under the two
main di¤erent approaches of the literature. The implicit collusion model approach with
two di¤erent types of strategies to enforce collusion, showed that the larger the cartel,
the easier to sustain. When collusion is explicit, that is …rms can meet somehow and can
sign a binding contract, then it has been proved that the incentives to free ride the cartel
play a central role, therefore only very small cartels can be enforced.
To be able to compare both models, a participation game has been set. In this model
the interaction between the incentive and the participation constraints, takes place. The
main conclusion has been that implicit collusion can enforce larger cartels than explicit
collusion, becoming therefore perhaps of greater concern for antitrust authorities.
It has been noticed in a very simple example that although asymmetry among …rms
does not help collusion, it can enhance the stability of partial cartels joining homogeneous
…rms in a collusive agreement.
It has also been noticed that mergers among fringe …rms can facilitate collusion, as
long as …rms that cooperate su¤er less free riding when competition outside is less severe.
However it has been left for future research a deeper analysis.
177 Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1: We have °(k) = ¼d¡¼k
¼d¡¼1. If we calculate
@°(k)
@k , we have that it is the




It is tedious but straightforward to show that, as long as k · n, we obtain that the
derivative is negative.




















We can show that the expression of Internal stability is decreasing in k. Therefore
showing that the condition does not hold at k = 3 so it also proves that coalitions of
k ¸ 3 are not stable. When k = n = 2 cooperation is sustainable. For k = 2, we can see
in the internal stability that if n ¸ 3 there are incentives to leave the cartel.
Proof. Proposition 3: The Nash equilibrium of the game is: wi = 0 8i , no collusive
agreement if ± < ±n. If ± 2 (±n;±k) k …rms cooperate, for k = (3;:::;n). If ± ¸ ±2, 2 …rms
cooperate whenever k = 2 is stable in the explicit collusion, and wi = 0 8i otherwise.
If ± < ±n no cartel con…guration is sustainable, therefore wi = 0 8i. If ± 2 (±n;±k),
among all the cartels that are sustainable, (k;:::;n) and k ¸ 3, only the smallest could be
enforced. This is because two reasons, external stability is hold and increasing in k for
k ¸ 2, therefore no …rm wants to join the cartel. When ± 2 (±n;±k), although internal
stability tells us if k ¸ 3 always a …rm wants to leave the cartel, a cartel of k is the only
stable, as long as k ¡1 …rms is not sustainable, and if a …rm leaves the cartel, its pro…ts
will turn to Nash-Cournot, which is worse than any cooperation pro…ts. When ± ¸ ±2
that is all cooperation con…guration is possible, the cooperation game becomes the same
as explicit collusion, thus the results are the same.
Proof. Corollary 2: This is straightforward to show, only seeing that the price of
the market is decreasing with k. Therefore, as the con…guration enforced in the market
involves smaller cartels, prices decrease.
Proof. Proposition 4: To see this, we should check the participation constraints, …rst
18let see the respective pro…ts of the …rms: a)Cartel 3 for x 1
2
d




b)Cartel 3 for z 1
4(1+5d) f)Cartel 2 for z 9
4
1+d





2 g) E¢cient member
of Cartel of 2 asym=8d 1+3d
(5+16d)
2 d)Cournot z 1+d
(3+4d)






2 i) No-e¢cient member of Cartel of 2 asym.=4 1+3d
(5+16d)
2 . Therefore the
conditions for the coalitions to hold both statements are the following: 1)Cartel of 3 if
a > c; b > d; b > f; a > h 2)Cartel of 2 if e > c; f > b; f > d 3)Asymmetric Cartel of








2 if d > 0:23, 1
4(1+5d) ¸ 1+d
(3+4d)


















































2 if d < 0:48 Therefore, we got
the conclusion that only symmetric partial cartel is stable and only for values of d above
0.77.
Proof. Proposition 5:Take from the incentive constraints of the cartel 2 and the
cartel 3, the function of the discount factor. Cartel 3 : For 1 ± ¸ ¡60d+148d2+160d3+64d4+9
¡42d¡355d2¡532d3¡124d4
and for 3 ± ¸ ¡ 320d4+384d3+20d2¡78d¡9
¡300d4¡360d3¡41d2+48d+4 We can see that this cartel can only be sustained
for d²(0:41;1:118).We can also easily see that the operative discount factor is the one
from 3 for values above 0:5 to 1:118. Take the incentive constraint of cartel 2: ± ¸
¡¡9¡24d¡16d2
24d+31d2 , we see that it is only possible for values above 0:7, so just comparing the
di¤erent thresholds we obtain that when both types of cartels can be sustained and that
partial asymmetric cartel can never be sustained.
Proof. Proposition 6: If 0:41 < d < 0:77 or if 0:77 < d < 0:85 and ±²(±3;1;±2;1) full
collusion is stable as long as is the only that can be sustained whereas if either 0:77 < d
and ±²(±2;1;1) partial symmetric cartel can be sustained and it is stable because even
tough it could be the case that full collusion was sustainable, …rm 3 would always quit,
making the cartel unstable.
Proof. Proposition 7: We obtain the cuto¤ ± for both stages of the punishment
phase, where the envelope of both will be the signi…cative cuto¤ that sustain the strate-




3 (k ¡ 1)
2 k2¡2k+1
10k3¡19k2+12k+12+4n+10nk+n2k2¡2nk3+4nk2+2n2k+n2+k4 are respectively decreas-
ing and increasing with k. Therefore the minimum value of the decreasing ± will be at
k = n. So we just have to calculate up to which value the decreasing part is above the
increasing part.. Thus the envelope from above of both cuto¤s is decreasing with k. So
19we get that this happens when the expression ¡1
3
¡20n¡1+2n4¡8n3
4n3¡2n2+4n+3 is positive, that is when
n < 5.
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